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1. Introduction 
It is widely assumed that the private sector is ‗obviously‘ more efficient than the public sector. It is 
supposed that private companies have demonstrated their superiority in performance, and that this 
reflects the theoretically expected superiority of markets over bureaucracies under political control. 
On the basis of these assumptions, much current debate about policy in infrastructure and services 
assumes that achieving private sector operation is an objective in itself, and is always a desirable 
result.  
 
However, the empirical evidence and the theoretical debates do not support this assumption. There is 
a consistent stream of empirical evidence consistently and repeatedly showing that there is no 
systematic significant difference between public and private operators in terms of efficiency or other 
performance measures. The theory behind the assumption of private sector superiority is also being 
shown to have serious flaws. 
 
This evidence is of great importance for policy discussion. Due to the unsupported assumption, 
policies have become seriously imbalanced, with various forms of privatisation being introduced, 
while public sector options which could be much better are being ignored. This is a costly form of 
policy failure which causes economic, social and political damage.  
 
2. General evidence on public and private efficiency 
Surprisingly, the clearest assertion that the evidence does not support a general assumption of superior 
private sector efficiency has been made by the IMF.  A policy paper written in 2004concerned public 
private partnerships (PPPs), and was written in consultation with the World Bank1. The question of 
private sector efficiency is crucial for justifying any form of PPP because public sector borrowing is 
invariable cheaper than private sector borrowing, and so the key issue is whether PPPs result in 
efficiency gains that more than offset the higher borrowing costs. The IMF paper states that:  “It 
cannot be taken for granted that PPPs are more efficient than public investment and government 
supply of services…” and supports this by reference to the arguments and evidence: “Much of the 
case for PPPs rests on the relative efficiency of the private sector. While there is an extensive 
literature on this subject, the theory is ambiguous and the empirical evidence is mixed. …” 2   
 
This declaration by the IMF followed earlier statements from the World Bank stating a neutral 
position on public or private operators. In July 2003 the Wall Street Journal ran a story headed ‗The 
World Bank as Privatisation Agnostic‘, 3 quoting senior WB officials on the re-appraisal of their 
policies on privatisation: “„There's certainly a lot of soul-searching going on‟ says Michael Klein, the 
World Bank's vice president for private-sector development” :  and the article announced that “World 
Bank officials have now decided it doesn't matter so much whether infrastructure is in public or 
private hands”.  
 
The empirical evidence from various surveys is that there is no systematic difference in efficiency 
between public and private operators. In 2002 Willner and Parker surveyed the large number of 
studies on the question of private versus public efficiency, in both developed, developing and 
transition countries, and observed that there is no consistent conclusion to be drawn: some show 
greater private sector efficiency, some showing greater public sector efficiency or no difference., and 
so they conclude that ―it appears from the empirical evidence that a change of ownership from public 
to private is not necessarily a cure for an under-performing organisation.‖ 4 
 
The theoretical justifications for the assumption are also weak. The political theory of public choice 
assumes both that all public sector workers and managers are motivated solely by economic greed, 
which is unrealistic, and also that a desire for re-election is the key driving force for political 
interference and distortion: Willner and Parker observe  that if this was true ―public ownership should 
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be more efficient in a Soviet-style economy without democratic elections than in, for example, North 
America or Western Europe and Scandinavia, where politicians more obviously compete for votes. In 
fact, however, experience suggests that the reverse is true.‖ Neither does the evidence support a 
consistent picture of labour extracting rents from the public sector - in some cases public sector pay 
clearly lags behind the private sector; and where there is monopoly or oligopoly of any kind, which 
requires public interest regulation if it is privatised:  ―it is then not certain that the joint effect of 
privatisation and regulation is higher efficiency than under public ownership. The theory of greater 
private incentives to cost-cutting applies to shareholders rather than managers, and the question 
becomes one of the overall set of incentives for managers in either case. Thus the conclusion is the 
same as from the empirical evidence: ―it is not possible to derive any definite conclusions about the 
superiority of private or public ownership from a completely general model.‖ An earlier paper by 
Willner also offered a theoretical model that political intervention may outperform an oligopolistic 
market: following non-commercial objectives such as maintaining employment does not have to be 
interpreted as a political distortion, because social welfare objectives might point to the same actions.  
 
A more specific assumption about privatization is that the UK, which pioneered large-scale 
privatisation under Mrs Thatcher, experienced a significant productivity gain as a result. However, 
this too is not supported by the evidence, which indicates that there has been no general efficiency 
gain from the privatisations.  
 
Studies in the early 1990s found that most of the improvements in productivity came before 
privatisation, not afterwards: and municipal refuse collection services improved as much as privatised 
ones. 5 A 1997 study concluded that their empirical material "…provides little evidence that 
privatisation has caused a significant improvement in performance. Generally the great expectations 
for privatisation evident in ministerial speeches have not been borne out"6.  
 
A comprehensive and exhaustive analysis by Massimo Florio, published in 2004, 7  reviewed all the 
privatisations and concluded: ―These results confirm the overall conclusion of previous studies that 
although the business cycle (and restructuring, while the company is under public ownership) has a 
discernible effect on a company‘s performance, privatisation per se has no visible impact. I have been 
unable too find sufficient statistical macro or micro evidence that output, labour, capital and TFP 
productivity in the UK increased substantially as a consequence of ownership change at privatisation 
compared to the long-term trend.‖  Florio also finds interesting results in respect of employment, 
namely that 7/8ths of all jobs cut in the industries were cut under public ownership, before 
privatisation; that pay levels relative to other workers did not change significantly as a result of 
privatisation, and comments that: ―The data I have cited seem to contradict the prediction by orthodox 
privatisation theories that the change of ownership implies a removal of possible rents attributed to 
workers. Either these rents did not exist….or alternatively the rents existed and continued to exist 
under private ownership, despite the weakening of the trade unions‖.  On the overall costs and 
benefits, he estimates a large gain to consumers and shareholders, offset by a loss to taxpayers (and 
possibly workers), concluding that the net welfare impact may be very small, zero, or even negative, 
and so amounted to ―a reshuffling of position of various agents, probably a regressive one‖.  
 
3. Relative performance of public and private sector water operators 
There are now a number of studies of the relative performance of public and private water utilities in 
both developed and developing countries. Overall, there is no evidence that public sector operators are 
intrinsically likely to be less efficient than private operators.  
 
A new World Bank paper by Estache et al in 2005 has summarised the econometric evidence on water 
efficiency thus:  
 
―Probably the most important lesson is that the econometric evidence on the relevance of ownership 
suggests that in general, there is no statistically significant difference between the efficiency 
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performance of public and private operators in this sector….For utilities, it seems that in general 
ownership often does not matter as much as sometimes argued. Most cross-country papers on utilities 
find no statistically significant difference in efficiency scores between public and private providers.‖ 8    
 
This is especially significant since Estache has co-authored a number of earlier studies which have 
been used to argue for the superior efficiency of the private sector. An earlier World Bank research 
paper, widely quoted in support of the view that private water operators are more efficient, was a 
study by Shirley and Walsh9 which claims that out of 24 comparative studies in infrastructure, half 
found private efficiency superior, 7 no difference, and only 5 found the public sector superior.  But in 
the Shirley/Walsh paper, only 2 of these 24 studies concerned the water industry, both carried out in 
1970s: one of them, in the USA alone, with a sample size of 2, is said to have concluded that private 
was more efficient; the other, with a sample size of 214, found that public sector performance was 
superior.  
 
The evidence that the public sector is not intrinsically less efficient is now supported by studies on 
water operators on all continents.   
 
On Latin America, a major paper published by the Brookings Institute in 2004 10  studied the growth 
in water and sanitation connections in cities in Argentina, Bolivia and Brazil, both in cities which had 
private sector participation, and in cities which had no private sector involvement.  Using household 
level data, it is the most comprehensive comparative survey of connections under private and public 
management – other case studies have focussed on private sector operations alone and assumed that 
any improvements observed were due to private ownership.  It concluded that ―while connections 
appear to have generally increased following privatization, the increases appear to be about the same 
as in cities that retained public ownership of their water systems‖.  
 
A 2004 study of about 4000 sanitation operations in Brazil found that there is no significant difference 
between public and private operators in terms of the total variation in productivity. Regional operators 
have lower productivity levels than municipalities. 11  A study of water utilities in Chile 12 found that 
private operators had increased investment and labour productivity by more than public companies: 
though they had also increased their rates by more, and had performed worse in dealing with 
unaccounted for water.  
 
In Africa, a 2004 study by Kirkpatrick at al, covering 110 African water utilities, including 14 private, 
found no significant difference between public and private operators in terms of cost.13  A much 
smaller earlier study by Estache and Kouassi of water operators in Africa in 2002 did find that private 
operators were more efficient, but only included 2 private operators, and institutional quality was a 
more important factor than private ownership in explaining differences in efficiency. 14   
 
In Asia, a similar mixed picture emerges. In 2004 the Asian Development Bank conducted a survey of 
18 cities in Asia, which included two cities with private sector concessions - Manila and Jakarta. 
These were performing significantly worse than most public sector operators on four indicators of 
coverage, investment, and leakage: 15  
- The percentage of households connected to water supply in Manila and Jakarta is lower than all 
other cities except one (Ulanbaator);  
- the percentage with access to sewerage in Manila and Jakarta is lower than in any of the other 
cities except one (Vientiane) 
- Capital expenditure (US dollars per connection) in Manila and Jakarta is much lower than in cities 
such as Delhi and  Dhaka, even though these latter are in countries with lower per capita income;  
- In terms of the levels of non-revenue water (leakage and unpaid consumption) Manila is worst, 
and Jakarta fourth worst. 
On six indicators (unit production costs, percentage of expenses covered by revenue, cost to 
consumers of constant level of  usage per month, 24 hour supply, tariff level, connection fee) their 
performance is middling, not outstanding.  The private cities perform relatively well on two 
indicators: revenue collection efficiency, and minimizing the number of staff per 1000 connections. 
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An earlier study by Estache et al16 on 50 cities in Asia in 1995 has had a double life. The first version, 
published in 1999, concluded that the results showed ―the private operators are more efficient‖; but 
the final report, published in 2002 in the World Bank‘s own economics journal, presents a very 
different conclusion: ―The results show that efficiency is not significantly different in private 
companies than in public ones‖ 17.  Estache has explained (pers. comm.) that the difference was due to 
using ‗better‘ econometric filters.  A study of towns in Cambodia found that consumer satisfaction 
and service continuity was higher (however prices were higher and not affordable for all), although 
the privatised towns had been selected by the operators and so may have been better performing 
anyway 18 
 
The picture is similar in respect of operators in OECD countries. Most recently, a Brookings Institute 
paper in 2005 looked at public and private water operators in the USA in terms of regulatory 
compliance and household expenditure on water. 19  It found that ―when controlling for water source, 
location fixed effects, county income, urbanization, and year, there is little difference between public 
and private systems.‖ 
 
4. Conclusion: no evidence for superior private sector efficiency 
This evidence points strongly to the conclusion that there is no systematic intrinsic advantage to 
private sector operation in terms of efficiency.  Equally, there is no evidence to assume that a public 
sector operator is intrinsically less efficient and effective.  Policy discussions should therefore be 
based on a strictly neutral assumption about relative efficiency, and in particular not regard 
introduction of private sector operation as a desirable or valuable objective. Otherwise policy 
decisions risk being distorted and leading to costly economic and social consequences.   
 
Although the great majority of urban water supply is provided by public sector operators, research and 
policy debate continues to focus heavily on various forms of private sector provision. The UK‘s DfID, 
for example, have just completed a 2-year research project into the non-multinational private sector, 
whose actual role in water supply provision, globally, is negligible. The World Bank Netherlands 
Water Partnership has financed intensive study on the possibilities of franchising, a form of business 
organization which was previously virtually unknown in water supply. The World Bank has carried 
out a study on the possibilities of public sector operations, but two-thirds of their selected cases 
included some form of private sector participation. This failure to study public sector water supply is 
especially damaging against the background of the MDGs: if they are to be attained, it will be 
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